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CHANGES IN BOARD OF STATE BAR EXAMINERS
Remster A. Bingham, of Indianapolis, who has been the Secretary of
the Board of State Bar Examiners since its organization, recently resigned as a member of the Board. Alan W Boyd, of Indianapolis, has
been appointed as Mr. Bingham's successor on the Board and as the
Secretary of the Board.
John Gould, Deputy in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme and
Appellate Courts, has been appointed Assistant Secretary. Otherwise
the Board remains as heretofore, namely: Milo N. Feightner, Huntington, Chairman; Bernard C. Gavit, Bloomington, Treasurer; Julian
Sharpnack, Columbus, and Lenn J. Oare, South Bend.

DEATHS
John B. Cockrum, Indianapolis, age 79, died April 15, 1937.
Jere West, Crawfordsville, died March 31, 1937.
Wilbur W. Hottel, Judge, Washington-Orange Circuit Court,
Salem, age 65, died April 29, 1937.
J. Clyde Hoffman, Indianapolis, age 55, died in May, 1937
Jay Nye, Winamac, Prosecuting Attorney of Pulaski County, age 58,
died May 7, 1937.
J. Fred Masters, Indianapolis, age 56, died April 19, 1937
Harry H. Cope, Madison, age 57, died in April, 1937.
Clinton K. Thorp, Washington, age 89, died in April, 1937.
George K. Gwartney, Corydon, age 82, died in April, 1937.

COMMENTS
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT DECISION
By FRED C. GAUSE* AND ERLE A. KIGHTLINGER-9

Preliminary
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which sustained the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act' was delivered by
Mr. Justice Stone and is reported in 57 Sup. Ct. 592. Any discussion
of this decision seems at first blush to come as an anticlimax to the more
recent decisions of the Court in sustaining the constitutionality of the
*Of the Indianapolis Bar and Past President of Indiana State Bar Association. 0f the Indianapolis Bar.
I The Railway Labor Act of May 20, 1926, C. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended
June 21, 1934, C. 691, 48 Stat. 1185, U. S. C. Title 45, Sections 151-163.
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National Labor Relations Act,2 more familiarly known as the Wagner
Act. However, an examination of this decision in the light of the authorities and reasoning therein contained undoubtedly aids in a proper
understanding of the opinions handed down on the Wagner Act, which
to many in the profession were startling in their implications. The
Court in these latter decisions quoted considerably from the earlier
opinion sustaining the Railway Labor Act, and therefore it seems appropriate that this decision should be carefully considered.
The Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 as amended in 1934, which was the
subject of the Court's decision, was the result of a long term congressional policy to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by labor
disputes and strikes and to provide a machinery for the amicable adjustment of such disputes between railroad labor and railroad management.
The more recent legislative treatment of this problem began, in 1920
with the enactment of the Transportation Act of that year. 3 Title III
of this Act concerned labor relations between the carriers which were
then returned to private management following the World War and
their employees. After this Act was in operation for some time its disabilities became apparent and the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was
enacted. The basic purpose of Congress remained unchanged, but the
statutory scheme designed to effectuate that purpose was modified as the
means to achieve the end sought became ineffective. Such legislative experience also led to the 1934 amendments to the Act. This evolutionary
development of legislation leading gradually to modifications as the need
for them is apparent is desirable, and there is abundant evidence that this
process will continue in so far as the question of labor policy is concerned.4
2 Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board (No. 365), 57 S. Ct.
650, and companion cases decided April 12, 1937;
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 57
S. Ct. 615,
National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Company, 57 S.Ct.
642;
National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company, Inc. 57 S. Ct. 645,

Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Company v. National Labor
Relations Board, 57 S. Ct. 648.
3 Transportation Act of 1920, Title III, Section 301, Fed. Stat. Ann., 1920
Supp. pp. 87-88, 41 Stat. L. 469.
4 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation, 57 S. Ct. 615 (628), said "The Act has been
criticised as one sided in its application; that it subjects the employer to supervision and restraint and leaves untouched the abuses for which employees may
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In Section 2 of the amended Act the general purposes of the legislation
are set out: To avoid any interruption to interstate commerce, to forbid any limitation upon the freedom of association or organization of
employees with a labor organization; to provide for the independence of
carriers and employees in the matter of self-organization; to provide for
the prompt settlement of disputes and grievances growing out of the
application or interpretation of agreements covering rates of pay, rules
or working conditions.
Then follow the all important parts of this Section under the heading
of "General Duties." After setting out that the carriers are under a
duty to exert every reasonable effort to maintain and make agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions and to decide all
disputes with expedition in conference with the representatives duly authorized and designated by the respective parties, the paragraph marked
"Third" extends to both carriers and employees the right to designate
and choose representatives without interference, coercion or influence by
either party. The paragraph marked "Fourth" reiterates the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing 5 and further significantly provides, "The majority
of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who
shall be the representatives of the craft or class for the purpose of this
Act."
It is then provided that no carrier shall deny or question the right of
an employee to join or organize a labor organization, nor shall any carrier interfere in any way with such organization, nor use the funds of
the carrier in maintaining and assisting a labor organization, nor to
coerce or attempt to induce an employee to join a particular labor organization nor to deduct from wages, dues or assessments to labor organizations or assist in any way in their collection. And "Fifth" carriers are
prohibited from requiring any person seeking employment to promise to
join or refrain from joining a labor organization as a condition of that
employment or if any such contracts are in existence upon the effective
date of the act such conditions are no longer binding.
The paragraph marked "Sixth" provides that in case of a dispute
be responsible; that it fails to provide a more comprehensive plan-with better

assurances of fairness to both sides and with increased chances of success in
bringing about, if not compelling, equitable solutions of industrial disputes affecting interstate commerce. But we are dealing with the power of Congress, not
with a particular policy or with the extent to which policy should go. We have
frequently said that the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field,
need not embrace all the evils within its reach. The Constitution does not 'forbid' cautious advance, 'step by step' in dealing with the evils which are exhibited
in activities within the range of legislative power."
5 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trade Council, 257 U. S.

184 (209).
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between the carrier and the employees arising out of grievances or the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning the rate of pay,
rules or working conditions, that it shall be the duty of the designated
representatives to specify the time and place for conference within ten
days after receipt of a notice of a desire on the part of either party to
confer in respect to such dispute.
Paragraph "Ninth" makes provision for the Mediation Board to investigate any dispute which should arise as to who are the chosen representatives of the employees and by the use of appropriate means to
ascertain such representatives by secret ballot or otherwise and to certify
after determination the names of the individuals or organizations which
have been duly elected as representatives. Then follows the provision
upon which both counsel and the court concentrated a major part of
argument and opinion. "Upon receipt of such certification the carrier
shall treat (our italics) with the representatives so certified as the representatives of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act."
The Act then provides for the creation and duties of the Adjustment
Board and the Mediation Board and sets out the mechanics for the interpretation and enforcing of agreements entered into by the parties and
for a system or arbitration providing there is voluntary submission by
the parties. The parts of the statute already expressly referred to are
the ones which are essential to the court's decision, and although the
subsequent sections relative to arbitration, etc., provide interesting reading they are outside the scope of the issues treated by the court's opinion.
The Factual Setting
System Federation No. 40 of the Railway Employee's Department of
the American Federation of Labor prior to July 1, 1922, represented the
mechanical department employees of the Virginian Railway. The mechanical department employees of the railway comprise six shop crafts.
These shop crafts are divided between (1) so-called "back shop employees" whose work consists solely of "classified repairs" 7 and "store
order work" and (2) employees engaged in making "running repairs."8'
On July 1, 1922, a strike was called. It was unsuccessful. On July
3, 1922, the Railway Labor Board adopted a resolution calling upon
employees of carriers to organize themselves into associations for the
purpose of collective bargaining. Pursuant to this resolution there was
6 Approximately one-third of the mechanical department employees are back
shop employees.
7 "Classified repairs" are heavy repairs made to locomotives and cars, such
as rebuilding and reconditioning for service. The locomotives and cars are
withdrawn from service for an average period of approximately 105 days for
the former and 109 days for the latter.
8 "Running repairs" are repairs to equipment other than classified.
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formed an organization known as the Mechanical Department Association of the Virginian Railway. The District Court in the case under
review 9 found as a fact that the Association was to a considerable extent
company-controlled. The Association continued in existence until 1927
without opposition at which time the Railway Employees' Department
of the American Federation of Labor made an effort to organize the
mechanical department employees into unions affiliated with itself. In
1934 the president of the Railway Employees' Department of the American Federation of Labor claimed the right to represent the mechanical
department employees, which claim was disputed by the Association and
the carrier.
The services of the Board of Mediation as organized under the Railway Labor Act of 1926 were invoked. Its investigation revealed that
the Federation had secured authorization from a substantial number of
employees affected, but not from a majority. Nothing further was done
until subsequent to the passage of the amended Railway Labor Act on
June 21, 1934. The matter was then referred to the new National
Mediation Board, which decided to hold an election 10 among the mechanical department employees. The National Mediation Board certified System Federation No. 40 as the representative for the employees
of the mechanical department.
The District Court further found that by interviews and a pamphlet
known as the "Sasser Statement" the railway exerted its influence upon
the employees in an effort to interfere with the choice of representatives.
After the National Mediation Board had issued its certification the
carrier refused to recognize or to treat with the Federation. The District Court also found that subsequent to the certification of the Board
there was an attempt to organize the Independent Shop Craft Associaion, ostensibly formed by an employee, Hearne, but that such organization was not a good faith attempt to represent the crafts, but was in fact
an employee acting primarily at the behest of the railway. The Federa9 The opinion below of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Virginia is reported in 11 F Supp. 621.
10 The election resulted as follows:
Eligible
Sheet M etal Workers ................................
52

For
Federation
37

For
Association
9

Carmen and Coach Cleaners ..................

266

98

20

M achinists ..................................................

267

141

41

Blacksmiths ................................................

46

22

Electrical Workers ..................................
114
80
Boilerm akers ..............................................
79
51

8

11
9

T otals ..............................................
8244
429
98
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tion then filed an action in the District Court seeking injunctive relief
in two respects:
First: They sought a prohibitory injunction restraining the carrier
from further acts of interference, influence or coercion toward the employees in question. The prayer for this relief was predicated upon Section 2, Third, of the Railway Labor Act.
Second: They sought a mandatory injunction compelling the carrier
to treat with the Federation as the representative of these employees as
required by Section 2, paragraph ninth of this same Act, wherein it is
provided that "upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat.
with the representatives so certified as the representative of the craft or
class for the purposes of this Act."
The relief prayed for was granted in both respects by the lower court,
and its position was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 1
The Circuit Court of Appeals expressly concurred with the findings
of fact of the District Court and therefore the Supreme Court took the
findings undisturbed for the purposes of the appeal, there being no show12
ing of palpable error.
The Issues and Decision Thereon
.A. The Mandatory Injunction Question.
The part of the decree which prohibited the carrier from interfering
with the employees in their free choice of representatives or in fostering
a company union was not challenged by the petitioner. Such an injunction was clearly within the powers of a court sitting in equity and the
sections of the statute upon which this part of the decree was predicated
had already been held to be properly within the congressional power.' 3
However, the decree also required the petitioner to "treat" with the respondent. Thus an affirmative obligation was established by mandatory
injunction. Further the court in order to effectuate the affirmative
obligation utilized the negative injunctive process of the classic case of
Lumley v. Wagner' 4 and decreed that the petitioner refrain from enter11 The opinion below of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth District is reported in 84 F (2d) 64-1.
12 Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114- (118), and cases cited, Charleston, S. C.,
Mining and Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 273 U. S. 220 (223); Texas & N. 0. R. R. Co.

v. Brotherhood, etc., 281 U. S. 548 (558), Peck Mfg. Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 57 S. Ct. 1 (2).
13 Texas & N. 0. R. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S. S. Clerks, 281
U. s.548 (558).
14 Lumley v. Wagner, Chancery, 1852, 1 De .G. M. & G. 604, in which Sir
Edward Sugden said, "It was objected that the operation of the injunction in
the present case was mischievous, excluding the defendant, J. Wagner, from
performing at any other theatre while this court had no power to compel her to
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ing into collective labor agreements with anyone but the respondent.
Thus the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether
or not the legislature by Section 2, Ninth, imposed upon a carrier an
obligation "to treat" which was enforceable in a court of equity. The
question was double edged. Did Congress intend by this Act to impose
a legal obligation "to treat?" Further without regard to congressional
intent was the court capable by equitable process of enforcing such an
obligation? And superimposed upon this question was the further consideration of whether or not the power of the court to act in this case
was restricted by sections of the Norris-La Guardia Act. 15
The Transportation Act of 1920 provided that "It shall be the duty
of all carriers and their officers, employees and agents to exert every reasonable effort and adopt every available means to avoid any interruption
to the operation of a carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees or subordinate officers thereof. All such disputes shall be considered and, if possible, decided in conference between
representatives designated and authorized so to confer by the carriers, or
the employees. . .

."

If the dispute was not decided in conference it

could be referred to the board which would make findings, and if necessary publish the same. The question of the legal enforceability of this
section had been brought before the Supreme Court in two cases.' 6
The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, said in the
first case:
"The decisions of the Labor Board are not to be enforced by process. The
only sanction of its decision is to be the force of public opinion invoked by the
fairness of a full hearing, the intrinsic justice of the conclusion, strengthened by
the official prestige of the board, and the full publication of the violation of such
decision by any party to the proceeding."
This position was reiterated by Chief Justice Taft in the second case.
The Transportation Act was substantially re-enacted in the Railway
Act of 1926 as to the provisions quoted above, but did add the pro-

hibition against coercive measures designed to influence or interfere with
perform at her Majesty's Theatre. It is true that I have not the means of compelling her to sing, but she has no cause of complaint, if I compel her to abstain from the commission of an act which she has bound herself not to do, and
thus cause her to fulfill her engagement."
15 March 23, 1932, C. 90, Art. 1, 47 Stat. U. S. C., Title 29, Sec. 101; Art.
2, 47 Stat. U. S. C., Title 29, Sec. 102; Art. 4, 47 Stat. U. S. C., Title 29, Sec.
104 (e) ; Art. 6, 47 Stat. U. S. C., Title 29, Sec. 106; Art. 7, 47 Stat. U. S. C.,
Title 29, Sec. 107, Art. 9, 47 Stat. U. S. C., Title 29, Sec. 109.
16 Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. United States Railroad Labor Board,
261 U. S. 72; Pennsylvania System v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 267
U. S. 203.

410

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

self orgamzation or designation of representatives. The Supreme Court
held that as to these additional provisions they were legally enforceable
obligations, and said in the opinion 7 in the "Railway Clerks Case"
which was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
"It is at once to be observed that Congress was not content with the general
declaration of the duty of carriers and employees to make every reasonable
effort to enter into and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and
working conditions, and to settle disputes with expedition in conference between authorized representatives, but added the distinct prohibition against
coercive measures. This addition cannot be treated as superfluous or insignificant, or as intended to be without effect. ExParte Public National Bank, 278
U. S. 101, 104. While an affirmative declaration of duty contained in a legislative enactment may be of imperfect obligation because not enforceable in terms,
a definite statutory prohibition of conduct which would thwart the declared purpose of the legislation cannot be disregarded."
Thus the court found an enforceable obligation in the Railway Labor
Act of 1926, but not at the same point it had before refused to find such
an obligation in the Transportation Act. Then the amendments to the
1926 Acts were added in 1934 and it was provided that the carriers
upon receipt of the certification from the Board "shall treat" with the
representative so certified. Has the unenforceable duty "to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agrements" been transformed
into a legally enforceable one by the mere addition to the statute of a
requirement that carriers "shall treat" with the chosen representative?
On this point the court said in the decision under review:
"It is, we think, not open to doubt that Congress intended that this requirement be mandatory upon the railroad employer, and that its command, in a
proper case, be enforced by the Courts. The policy of the Transportation Act
of encouraging voluntary adjustment of labor disputes, made manifest by these
provisions of the Act which clearly contemplated the moral force of public
opinion as affording its ultimate sanction, was, as we have seen, abandoned by
the enactment of the Railway Labor Act. Neither the purposes of the Labor
Act, as amended, nor its provisions when read, as they must be, in the light of
our decision in the Railway Clerks case, supra, lend support to the contention
that its enactments which are mandatory in form and capable of enforcement by
judicial process were intended to be without legal sanction"
It is clear that the court now feels that the changes in the Railway
Labor Act manifest an intention upon the part of Congress to impose
an enforceable obligation.
17 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281
U. S. 548.

COMMENTS

411

But is not this affirmative declaration of duty "to treat" an imperfect
obligation- beyond the powers of a court of equity to enforce? Does not
the duty depend upon the feelings, desires and mental attitudes of the
respective parties and thus concern a subject matter beyond judicial control? The situation is analogous to that of enforcing specific performance of contracts of singers, artists and arbitration.' s On this point the
court said:
"Whether the decree will prove useless as to lead a court to refuse to give
it, is a matter of judgment to be exercised with reference to the special circumstances of each case . . more is involved than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable consequence to the public. . . . Courts of equity

may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in
the furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only
private interests are involved..
The fact that Congress had indicated its purpose to make negotiation obligatory is in itself a declaration of public interest
and policy which should be persuasive in inducing courts to give relief."
The negative phase of the decree before mentioned cannot be neglected
when consideration is given to the possibility of the court's decree resulting in a useless and idle gesture. And it is apparent that the court,
although appreciating the difficulty of enforcing such an affirmative
obligation, still thought that the decree of the District Court was
"worth the effort."
The petitioner advanced a novel suggestion that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act precluded the court from granting an injunction prohibiting the
act of giving publicity to the facts involved in any labor dispute. The
Act provides in Section 4, "No court of the United States shall ...issue
any restraining order or . . . injunction in any case involving . . . any
labor dispute to prohibit any person . . . interested in such dispute . ..
from doing

. . .

any of the following acts: .

.

. (e) Giving publicity to

the existence of, or the facts involved, in any labor dispute, whether by
advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence." It was argued that the "Sasser Statement," heretofore mentioned, was an act upon the part of the petitioner to give such
publicity to a labor dispute. In the light of the court's findings of fact
that the statement was an attempt to coerce employees, it is difficult to
view it as an act to publicize facts of a labor dispute. Further the
Norris-LaGuardia Act states that no organization or association should
be held liable for the unlawful acts of individuals or officers unless there
was clear evidence of participation by such association. Again reviewing
the court's findings of fact there was such evidence. The Act also provides that only injunctions or restraining orders should issue from a
18 Tobey v. Bristol, Fed. Cas. No. 14,065 at page 1321 (C. C. Mass., 1845)

Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4ed.) at Section 2180.
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court which contained language prohibiting only the specific acts complained of in the bill of complaint. This is designed to prevent "blanket
injunctions" from issuing from the courts and not to preclude the courts
from issuing mandatory injunctions. But the court disposed of the
whole question on the basis that the Norris-LaGuardia Act established
a general rule applicable to the granting of injunctions in cases growing
out of labor disputes and that the Railway Labor Act as amended, and
enacted subsequent to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and imposing speciffic
statutory obligations, would control. 19 The court said"
"Such provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."
B.

The Interstate Commerce Question.

The fact that Congress has the power to regulate the relations of employees and rail carriers by such means as are reasonably calculated to
prevent an interruption to interstate commerce by strikes and attendant
consequences cannot be questioned. 20 The question that arises here is
whether or not the Railway Labor Act, as amended, can properly be
said to apply to "back-shop" employees who are admittedly not engaged

in interstate commerce, but whose activities are strictly intrastate 2in1
their character. The court has held that manufacture is not commerce,
and the analogy between such activity and that involved in the decision
in question is apparent. And even though the products of manufacture
or production be intended to be transported or sold outside of the state,
as such, subthe fact does not render such production or manufacture,
22
ject to Federal regulation under the commerce clause.
But the court in the Railway Labor Act decision proceeds clearly
upon the assumption that the activities of the "back-shop" employees are
not within themselves interstate commerce and could not be regulated as
such. But the power of Congress over interstate commerce carries with
it as a necessary concomitant, the power to protect that commerce by the
regulation of activities which may be intrastate in character but which
19 Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S.
548 (571), Callahan v. U. S., 285 U. S. 515 (518), Ex Parte United States, 226
U. S. 420 (424), Rodgers v. U. S., 185 U. S. 83 (87-89) ; International Alliance
v. Rex Theatre Corp., 73 F (2d) 92 (93).
20 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (347-348).
21 Crescent Cotton Oil Company v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129; Carter v.
Carter Coal Company, 298 U. S. 238.
22 Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U. S. 238, Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S.
517, Arkadelphia Milling Company v. St. Louis S. W Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 134,
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Company, 260 U. S. 245, Chassaniol v. City of
Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584.

COMMENTS

"have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that
there control is esseritial or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions." 2 3 On this point the court said:
"The activities in which these employees are engaged have such a relation
to the other confessedly interstate activities of the petitioner that they are to be
regarded as a part of them. All taken together fall within the power of Congress over interstate commerce. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. 'V.Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 619, 31 S. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878; cf. Pedersen '.
Delaware, Lacka'wanna & Western R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 151, 33 S. Ct. 648,
57 L. Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153. Both courts below have found that interruption by strikes of the back shop employees, if more than temporary, would
seriously cripple petitioner's interstate transportation. The relation of the back
shop to transportation is such that a strike of petitioner's employees there, quite
apart from the likelihood of its spreading to the operating department, would
subject petitioner to the danger, substantial, though possibly indefinable in its
extent, of interruption of the transportation service. The cause is not remote
from the effect. The relation between them is not tenuous. The effect on commerce cannot be regarded as negligible. See United States v'. Railway Employees' Department of American Federation of Labor (D. C.), 290 F. 978, 981,
holding participation of back shop employees in the nation-wide railroad shopmen's strike of 1922 to constitute an interference with interstate commerce. As
the regulation here in question is shown to be an appropriate means of avoiding that danger, it is within the power of Congress."

The court thus recognizes that the employees who are participating
in purely intrastate activities are still subject to the interstate commerce
power of Congress when that power is exercised by such legislation as
23 Where the relationship is sufficiently direct: Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612. (The length of hours of service of those engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce) ; Southern Railway
Co. v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20 (safety appliance act as to cars moving in intrastate
and interstate commerce); Houston E. & W Texas Ry. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S.
342 (Federal control over rates on intrastate traffic), The Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (state control excluded over rates on intrastate traffic);
Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Cot,
257 U. S. 563 (rate control), Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks, 281 U. S.
548 (Railway Labor Act sustained as applying to accounting and clerical
forces) ; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (combination to restrain interstate commerce by intrastate activities) ; Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n., 274 U. S. 37 (combination to restrain
interstate commerce by intrastate activities).
Where the relationship is too remote: A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
U. S.,295 U. S. 495 (hours and wages in poultry slaughter houses and sales
made to retail dealers and butchers) , First Employers Liability Cases, 207 U. S.
463 (Federal regulation applying to compensation for injuries of employees not
engaged in interstate commerce).
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the Railway Labor Act, as amended, which is reasonably calculated to
minimize and eliminate interruptions and obstructions to interstate commerce. This decision goes no further than stating that labor relationships between employees and the carriers are cognizable by Congress
under the interstate commerce power in so far as those relationships concern collective bargaining and in so far as it is to be made an effective
instrumentality for the promotion of peaceful and amicable settlement
of labor disputes because there is a direct connection between such relationships and repercussions, real or potential, upon interstate commerce.
C.

Questions Under the Fifth Amendment.

The Fifth Amendment is not a guarantee of untrammeled freedom
of action and of contract. 24 After the court decided that the Railway
Labor Act, under the interstate commerce power, was a means chosen
by Congress to accomplish a permissible end there was "little scope for
the operation of the due process clause." The operation of the Fifth
Amendment in this case was further circumscribed because the railroad
could not rely upon alleged infringements of its employees' rights. 25 The
petitioner's position amounted to the contention that it was being forced
to have "business relations" which under the Constitution it was at
liberty to refuse, and further that such compulsion "to treat" with respect
to the terms of a contract is a part of the contractual process. And since
the employer cannot be compelled to take the ultimate step represented
by the agreement of contract 20 he cannot be compelled to take the initial
steps looking towards the agreement. The court said.
"The provisions of the Railway Labor Act invoked here neither compel the
employer to enter into any agreement, nor preclude it from entering into any
contract with individual employees. They do not interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them."

The carrier is free under the Act to contract with individual employees as individuals and not as representatives. To the extent that
there are representatives the carrier is compelled to treat only with those
24 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 S. Ct. 578, Atlantic Coast Line
Ry. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley,
etc., 276 U. S. 71, Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Company, 279 U. S.
253, Packer Corporation v. Utah, 285 U. S. 104, Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502; Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U. S. 240.
25 Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571 (576), Erie R. Co. v. Williams,
233 U. S. 685 (697) ; Rail & River Coal Co. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236
U. S. 338 (349); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U. S. 226 (227);
Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U. S. 114 (123).
20 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1.
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who represent the majority of the employees. To this extent the freedom of the carrier is circumscribed, but we take it that such limitation is
justified, since it is a necessary consequence of the proper exercise of the
interstate commerce power.
D.

The Question as to the Majority.

Section 2, Fourth, of the Railway Labor Act provides: "The majority
of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who
shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purpose of this
Act." The interpretation of the word "majority" as used in this section,
presents the question of whether the choice is dependent upon a majority
of all of those qualified to vote, or whether in cases where a majority of
those qualified to vote participate in the election, a majority of the votes
cast is sufficient. The court applied t e latter rule and said
"Election laws providing for approval of a proposal by a specified majority
of an electorate have been generally construed as requiring only the consent
of the specified majority of those participating in the election. Carrol County V.
Smith, 111 U. S. 556; Douglas v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Sneed, (Tenn.) 637, Montgomery County Fiscal Court v.Trimble, 104 Ky. 629. Those who do not participate 'are presumed to assent to the
expressed will of the majority of those voting.' County of Cass 'u. Johnston, 95
U. S.360, 369, and see Carroll County v. Smith, supra.
"We see no reason for supposing that Section 2, Fourth, was intended to
adopt a different rule."
The analogy to the majority vote of the electorate or of stockholders
is not a perfect one. In the Railway Labor Act we are dealing with a
majority vote designed to reveal a choice upon the part of employees as
to representatives. The very issue as to whether or not the employee
desires to be represented by any association or organization is just as

much involved as the question as to who that representative should be.
To hold that if an employee refuses to participate in an election that this
fact indicates an assent to be represented by the representative who
happens to be chosen by a majority of those voting seems to be straining
the concept that "inaction implies consent."
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